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 Introduction 
 Reframing the religious underground 
 James A. Kapaló and Kinga Povedák 
 As one of the primary instruments of political control and social change 
both in the Soviet Union and in the satellite states in Eastern Europe, the 
secret police played a pivotal role in most, if  not all, anti- religious operations 
launched during the communist period. They did so with specially trained, 
dedicated units established to counter the activities of enemies labelled as 
“clerical reactionary forces,” “spies” or “saboteurs” and to prevent the per-
nicious infl uence on socialist society of superstition, religious charlatanry 
and economic exploitation; all of which were associated with the activities 
of the so- called religious underground. Following the establishment of Soviet 
power, and in close collaboration with the relevant government ministries, 
commissions and agencies, the secret police were charged with maintaining 
the social order, which entailed identifying, surveilling and infi ltrating reli-
gious communities in order to undermine, eliminate or control them from 
within. As Soviet infl uence and domination extended into Central and 
Eastern Europe following the Second World War, anti- religious and anti- sect 
policies were adopted and enacted – in some cases wholesale, in others only 
piecemeal – by the new subject regimes and their own recently formed secret 
police forces. 
 In the context of the Cold War, the fate of religious leaders, Church 
institutions and ordinary believers became a cause célèbre of the West, where 
society was mobilized in the name of the defence of religion against atheism 
and an image was projected of defi ant priests and pastors engaged in a serious 
game of cat and mouse with the secret police. This image of a religious under-
ground, which was based on the testimonies and reports of religious dissidents 
and émigrés, was promoted by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty that 
claimed to be able to report on the realities behind the Iron Curtain but were 
themselves of course heavily biased by Western perceptions of what life must 
have been like there (Kasprzak  2004 ). Between the offi cial Soviet narrative 
of the “victorious war against superstition” and the corresponding “religious 
narrative of martyrdom” (Kelly  2012 , 305) which was disseminated in the 
West, there was a much more complex lived reality in which violent perse-
cution and repression at the hands of the secret police formed only a part. 
Accommodation, compromise and collaboration were also central to this 
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relationship. The religious communities that came to be referred to as the 
religious underground, however, were not devoid of agency; they were able to 
deploy creative means not only of avoiding arrest, foiling agents and uncover 
informers, but also to establish resilient, viable and meaningful lifeworlds 
beyond the strictures and confi nes of offi cially prescribed lives in the factory 
or on the collective farm. 
 Following the fall of the communist regimes in the region, scholars have 
gained a considerable, if  also extremely problematic, new resource for the study 
of religions. In many states, the communist secret police left behind a vast 
archival collection that meticulously catalogued the complexity of their infor-
mation gathering and repressive operations from brutal mass deportations, 
undercover operations and interrogations, to the subtle manipulations and 
creative fabrications of secret agents. The archives of the secret police have 
been at the heart of an urgent re- examination of the legacy of communism 
aimed at “clarifying the past, uncovering the truth, and furthering the search 
for justice” (Apor et al.  2017 , 1). The truth and justice projects pursued through 
the archives have proven highly contentious, exacerbating the particular eth-
ical and epistemological challenges that confront scholars of religions working 
with secret police materials. This volume engages the incontestable abundance 
and incontrovertible complexity of secret police archival documents with the 
aim of fostering new methodological approaches and comparative research 
on the complex intersection of religion and state security in the communist 
and post- communist context. The authors included in this volume recognize, 
however, that the secret police archives, especially when approached as stand- 
alone sources, have their limits. Several authors in this volume are at the fore-
front of endeavours to engage the archives in dialogue with other sources and 
their contributions draw on the archives of religious communities, contem-
porary testimonies and oral historical interviews. In addition to contributing 
to our understanding of the history of Church- state relations, of communist- 
era state security, and indeed of religion under communism in general, this 
volume also aims to inform our understanding of the role of memory politics 
in post- communist societies, questions of democratic rights and freedoms of 
minority groups, the roots and legacy of activism and dissent in the region 
and the very question of the value and status of truth and trust in contem-
porary society. 
 Comparative endeavours in relation to the varied experiences of com-
munism in Eastern and Central Europe are relatively rare, and especially with 
regards to religion under communism (one notable exception is Ramet  1998 ), 
as most scholarship has, as Blaive (2018, 1) points out, tended to emphasize 
national exceptionalism over “a systematic approach to understanding com-
munism as an international social phenomenon.” 
 The diversity of  the religious fi eld in Central and Eastern Europe, with 
its mix of  Catholic and Orthodox majority states, signifi cant Protestant 
communities and its bewildering array of  religious minorities and ethno- 
religious groups, has also mitigated against taking a regional approach in 
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favour of  pursuing research projects based on confessional particularity. 
Whilst regional studies of  Orthodoxy, Protestant Churches or the Catholic 
Church under communism have explored the particular circumstances 
of  their encounter with hostile communist regimes (see, for example, 
Kosicki  2016 ; Leu ș tean  2009 ; Michel  1991 ; Ramet ed.  1988 ,  1990 ,  1992 ), 
this volume, rather than drawing a distinction along confessional lines, 
approaches the diversity of  religious activity targeted by the state through 
the lens of  the “religious underground,” a label that was used both by the 
communist secret police and by those resisting them. This term, which has 
both a literal and a metaphorical meaning, came to refer to all unregis-
tered or legally proscribed religious communities that were the target of 
the secret police from the earliest days following the Bolshevik Revolution 
until well into the 1980s. We have drawn together studies from both the 
Soviet Union (Ukraine, Moldova and Lithuania) and a number of  satellite 
communist countries (Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) as 
well as Yugoslavia in order to highlight the commonalities and divergent 
practices through time of  the secret police in their anti- religious operations 
and to explore the various ways in which religious communities responded 
to them. The studies collected here deal mainly with Christian Churches and 
communities in the European territories of  the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe (with the notable exception of   Chapter 8 by Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson 
who explores the secret police campaign against Krishna Consciousness 
(ISKCON) in Lithuania). 
 Religious discrimination, ranging from the bureaucratic to the violent and 
genocidal, has been an integral part of human history up to the present day, 
even in democratic societies and the targeting of religious communities by 
state security agencies in the twentieth century was by no means limited to the 
communist world. Looking beyond Eastern Europe there are many obvious 
opportunities for comparative analysis and refl ection. In the US, the FBI has 
in the course of the twentieth century targeted numerous religious groups 
employing many of the techniques we associate with communist dictatorships 
including mass surveillance and agent infi ltration operations, propaganda 
campaigns based on fabricated evidence, and the widespread interpretation 
of religious beliefs as political dissent, criminal behaviour and, most recently, 
terrorism (Johnson and Weitzman  2017 , 2). The processes by which, under 
the guidance and name of J. Edgar Hoover, internal enemies were produced 
by casting suspicion on progressive, pacifi st and left- leaning religious groups 
resulted in the FBI policing “the borders between true and false religion” 
(Johnson and Weitzman  2017 , 3) using means similar to those deployed by the 
KGB, which had been tasked with maintaining another religious boundary, 
this time between scientifi c atheism and the backward superstition and reac-
tionary clericalism of religious people and institutions. In fact, the context of 
the Cold War, which in the West was frequently characterized as a crusade to 
defend religion, offers an important lens through which to view the securitiza-
tion of religion in diverse times and settings. 
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 The introduction to this volume was written in the spring of 2020 in the 
midst of the Covid- 19 pandemic whilst many in the world were in so- called 
“lock- down.” The quarantine under which large portions of the population 
of Europe and the wider world found ourselves included the introduction of 
new policing measures, surveillance by drones, road checks, monitoring of all 
public spaces and gatherings as well as the closure of most businesses. Places 
of worship were ordered to shut in a move that in post- communist Eastern 
Europe carried echoes from former times of the forced closure of churches 
during the communist era. Reports of neighbours spying on and informing 
on each other became widespread, as was the case also with police inspections 
of houses and gardens, and even the contents of the grocery shopping of 
those suspected of contravening the new regulations. The state and the media 
mobilized public support to prevent public health measures from being 
sabotaged by the dangerous actions of irresponsible citizens. In short, we 
witnessed how the role of the police could swiftly change in times of crisis 
and how the discursive strategies of the state could alter our perceptions of 
our everyday activities, of our friends, neighbours and colleagues. What a few 
short weeks earlier would have appeared implausible or ridiculous became a 
concrete and for some a painful lived reality. The opportunities for societal 
self- refl ection at this juncture are enormous; How and why are we motivated 
to comply or resist when our freedoms are constrained? How resilient are we 
when confronted with restrictions that change fundamentally the pattern of 
our days and the rhythm of our lives? How do we respond to unpalatable 
“facts” and what motivates us to seek alternative truths to comfort ourselves 
or to shape our resistance? 
 Religious resistance and the formation of the underground 
 The term “religious underground” was deployed by the Soviet state as early as 
the 1920s to refer to religious communities that were denied registration or were 
legally prohibited. Its meaning, however, expanded to signify the many reli-
gious practices that were extralegal, that were discouraged by the state or that 
simply slipped from view. First Lenin, then later both Stalin and Khrushchev 
recognized that hasty anti- religious policies, if  conducted without prepara-
tory ideological groundwork, could easily lead to a strengthening of religious 
feeling and an increase in the number of unregistered groups (Fletcher  1970 , 
364; see also Lisnic,  Chapter 1 , this volume). Commenting on this dynamic in 
1970, Fletcher ( 1970 , 365) observed that “So long as believers are permitted 
legal outlets for their religious desires, their activities can be observed and, 
to some extent, supervised” but if  these options are eradicated the challenge 
of day- to- day control “must be overcome by the most laborious process of 
investigation and liquidation.” Fletcher, in his slightly simplistic character-
ization of this process, nevertheless makes a salient point, as worshipping 
legally and openly became impossible, or the compromises involved became 
intolerable to believers, the catacomb churches and clandestine forms of 
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religious practice, from catechism classes to secret baptisms, and from apoca-
lyptic chain- letters to secret pilgrimages, multiplied and became increasingly 
more creative. Therefore, in addition to the powerful religious institutions 
and fi gureheads that the regime had initially targeted and desired to topple, 
a whole raft of new innovative manifestations of religion became the target 
of the secret police and state propaganda. The religious underground, as 
Vagramenko elucidates (Chapter 2, this volume) “was the kind of discourse 
the Soviet secret police harboured and caused to function as true” through 
both the generation of knowledge and the direct exercise of repressive actions. 
 By placing the notion of the religious underground at the centre of focus 
of this volume, we aim to bring more sharply into focus the dialogical pro-
cess that gave birth to a range of grassroots activities, local practices and 
lived religious lifeworlds that were both the target and the product of diverse 
repressive operations. As Glennys Young has highlighted in relation to the 
study of religion and politics in the Soviet Union, which we contend holds 
true for the other communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe, reli-
gion has been treated as “an object of Soviet political mobilization” (1997, 
3) with little attention accorded to the ways in which religious agency shaped 
society, culture and politics. The varied and sometimes rich observations 
and representations of everyday religious life to be found in the archival 
documents of the secret police, which are central to the studies in the present 
volume, grant us the opportunity, notwithstanding their inherent problems, to 
explore questions that have heretofore been somewhat neglected. 
 Although we associate the religious underground with communist repres-
sion, it is important to note that covert religious communities predated both 
the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the communist takeover in Central and 
Eastern Europe. For centuries Orthodox dissenters in Tsarist Russia had been 
establishing secret networks and communities in isolated locations in order to 
avoid the attention of the authorities whilst in many states in the interwar and 
wartime periods, the policies pursued by nationalist and right- wing regimes 
aimed at homogenizing nation- states around the respective majority ethnic 
and religious identity produced their own local clandestine forms of religion. 
In this context, mainstream and majority religions often played a role in the 
repression of smaller and newer religious communities. In the 1930s and 40s, 
not only in the Soviet Union, but also across the region, arrest, detention 
in labour camps and deportation had become widespread means of dealing 
with banned religious groups and problematic leaders. By the time of the 
communist takeover in Romania for example, Old Calendarists, Inochentists, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Adventists, and Baptists (see Cindrea- Nagy,  Chapter 16 , 
this volume) had developed tried and tested methods of avoiding detection, 
hiding their leaders or concealing their meetings in order to preserve their 
traditions (see also Kapaló  2019 , 107– 77). Likewise, in Hungary, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Nazarenes and Seventh day Adventists had suffered similar repres-
sion (see Petrás,  Chapter 5 , this volume) and developed their own clandestine 
practices. Religious difference and innovation in this period, perhaps like at 
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no other time since the Thirty Years War, had become associated with enmity 
towards the state. 
 Communist repression of religion was of course different in one key 
respect, namely the committed goal to eradicate totally religious faith and 
practice from society. Nevertheless, policies and strategies towards religion 
adapted over time, often for pragmatic reasons (Young  1997 , 2). During the 
early years of Soviet power, policies towards religion were directed mainly at 
separating Church and state. The Separation Decree of 1918 seemed to level 
the religious fi eld by granting equal legal recognition for citizens to profess 
any faith or none (Wanner 2007, 36) and this was followed by moves to reduce 
the economic power of the Orthodox Church and its control over education. 
Following the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924, however, anti- religious 
policy changed in favour of propaganda as the main tool including public 
debates, exhibitions, lectures and publications (Wanner 2007, 39), although 
this went hand in hand with “rough methods” including physical attacks on 
Church property, clergy and laity (Young  1997 , 3). Newspapers and journals 
such as  Bezbozhnik (Godless) and  Antireligioznik (Antireligious), dedicated 
to the publication of anti- religious and anti- sect propaganda were published 
and supported by the League of Militant Atheists, recruited to campaign 
and mobilize the people against religious institutions. The anti- religious 
campaigns of the 1920s, which were intended to liberate people from the grip 
of irrational belief  and superstition were, however, a relative failure, especially 
in the countryside (Wynot  2004 , 97– 9). 
 Metropolitan Sergei’s Declaration of Loyalty signed in 1927 marked a 
watershed in relations between the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox 
believers. From this point forward, diverse groups that refused to accept the 
compromise or who were denied offi cial recognition coalesced into a diffuse 
religious underground under the umbrella name of the True Orthodox 
Church (see Vagramenko,  Chapter 2 , this volume). 1929 saw the passage of 
new wide- ranging laws to regulate religion, including the Law on Religious 
Associations, which became “the principal normative source of Soviet restric-
tion on churches” (Boiter 1987, 109). Amendments to the Constitution, effect-
ively confi scated all Church property and turned it over to local authorities 
as well as criminalizing unregistered religious communities and public evan-
gelism and prohibiting all forms of religious education and severely restricted 
publishing activities (Wanner 2007 48– 9). These changes heralded in a much 
harsher period of “threefold secularization” designed to eliminate the role 
of religion in social, moral and political life that consisted of dismantling 
the Orthodox Church and its authority, removing religion from the public 
sphere and the propagation of an alternative Marxist materialist ideology to 
replace religious beliefs (Wanner 2007, 52). In addition to the use of propa-
ganda and direct punitive action against individuals, including deportations 
and executions, the state also began to close and destroy places of worship. 
Starting with the Russian Orthodox Church but soon extending to other 
denominations and religions, thousands of churches and monasteries were 
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closed and their buildings and land appropriated by the state. Monasteries 
were considered especially dangerous as places offering shelter to the “enemies 
of the people” (see Vasile,  Chapter 13, this volume). By 1929, all monastic 
institutions in Russia had been closed producing the widespread phenom-
enon of vagrant ex- monastics who formed their own hidden communities and 
networks in both rural and urban settings (Wynot  2004 ). 
 Besides the direct mass repression of the Orthodox Church, the major 
upheavals of collectivization and grain requisitioning in the countryside 
contributed to an upswing in popular religious agency and apocalyptic 
expectation amongst the peasantry at large (see Viola  1990 ; Smith  2006 ) that 
bolstered membership of a whole range of emergent clandestine forms of 
religious community and practice. As Vagramenko explores ( Chapter 2 , this 
volume), the secret police referred to these prophetically and eschatologically 
inspired movements under diverse names including “Red Dragonists” or “the 
ecclesiastic- monarchist underground” amongst others. 
 The religious underground also expanded to include another important 
category of believers, the so- called sectarians. Despite the preferential 
treatment that many sectarian groups received in the fi rst few years following 
the Bolshevik takeover when efforts were made to mobilize them in the class 
struggle (see Lisnic,  Chapter 1 , this volume), by 1923 the Communist Party 
of Ukraine had noticed that controlling sectarians was signifi cantly more 
diffi cult than controlling the centralized and hierarchical Orthodox Church 
(Wanner 2007, 39; see Pintilescu,  Chapter 4 and Petrás,  Chapter 5 , this 
volume). From the mid- 1920s, groups such as the Seventh Day Adventists, 
Baptists, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Nazarenes and Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
also denied offi cial recognition. These unregistered religious groups were, by 
their nature, diffi cult to keep track of and control (Baran  2014 , 46); many 
of them had never been offi cially recognized or registered in the fi rst place 
and hence there were no public records pertaining to them. Certain sectarian 
groups were considered especially dangerous because of their international 
connections and pacifi st teachings, a stance that resulted in the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, especially, being the target of some of the most severe of repressive 
operations aimed at any group (see Ca ș u,  Chapter 6 , and Petrás,  Chapter 5 , 
this volume). 
 With the advent of the Second World War, however, Stalin was forced to 
reconsider his attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church as he needed to 
strengthen “emotional loyalty to the state” amongst the populace (Dragadze 
 1993 , 153). The new attitude culminated in the famous meeting between Stalin 
and the Bishops of the Orthodox Church that took place on September 4, 
1943, at which an understanding was reached that normalized Church- state 
relations and allowed the Church to conduct normal activities. In Russia, at 
least for a time, Orthodox worshippers could once again attend church, per-
form services at home and take part in religious processions. Islam, which had 
similarly been suppressed before the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union out 
of fear of pan- Islamic resistance, was also offi cially tolerated. By contrast, 
8 James A. Kapaló and Kinga Povedák
the so- called sectarians fared very badly in the immediate post- war period 
(Chumachenko  2002 , 190). 
 All the states that fell under Soviet hegemony after World War II adopted 
this Stalinist model of Church- state relations where separation, in effect, 
came to mean total control, subordination and surveillance (see Petrás, 
 Chapter 5 , and Köbel,  Chapter 3 , this volume). In the 1940s and 50s, in the 
newly acquired or reoccupied lands of the Western Soviet Union and in the 
new satellite states, widespread closures of monastic institutions and nation-
alization of their property and land took place. The dissolution of monas-
teries gave birth to the widespread phenomenon in these countries too of 
forms of secret monasticism and the establishment of home- based commu-
nities of ex- monks and nuns witnessed earlier in Soviet lands (see  Bögre and 
Szabó 2010 ; Hesz,  Chapter 10 , this volume; Kapaló,  Chapter 12 , this volume). 
In Moldova, the closure of all but one monastery in the republic in the period 
from 1958 to 1965 had the unforeseen consequence of breathing new life into 
already existing underground religious dissent movements. The mass arrest of 
Greek Catholic clergy in 1944– 45 and the forced unifi cation of the Church in 
Soviet Ukraine with the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946 was followed a few 
years later in 1948 in Romania and in 1950 in Czechoslovakia with the closure 
of their Greek Catholic diocese, in effect producing some of the largest cata-
comb churches and communities in the region. 
 Under these conditions, in order to secure the basic right to operate, 
Churches across the region were forced to make certain compromises with the 
state along the lines of Metropolitan Sergii’s Declaration of Loyalty. Legal 
acknowledgement was granted in exchange for loyalty but as Köbel notes 
these “were technically contracts but served as political accords. Complete 
loyalty and political support were demanded from the religious leadership in 
exchange for their legality” ( Chapter 3 , this volume). The freedom to operate 
was severely curtailed and in relation to these concessions, as Köbel notes 
( Chapter 3 , this volume), “every Church had an opposing, nonconformist 
layer.” The nonconformists could be found in a wide variety of forms. In the 
Soviet Union, the attack on the Orthodox Church produced numerous and 
widespread “reactive movements” such as those described by Vagramenko 
( Chapter 2 , this volume), whilst in communist satellite states there were, 
for example, problematic and outspoken critics amongst the clergy in the 
Protestant Church in the Czech Republic (Mat ě jka,  Chapter 9 , this volume) 
and “clerical nonconformists” in the Catholic Church in Hungary who refused 
to obey their bishops (Köbel,  Chapter 3 , this volume). In Romania, such non- 
conformist factions and tendencies were labelled “anarchist groups” by the 
state (see Pintulescu,  Chapter 4 , this volume). In some cases, dissent within 
offi cially recognized Churches led to actual splits with nonconformists forming 
their own underground organizations as happened with the Seventh Day 
Adventist Church in both the Soviet Union and Hungary (Köbel,  Chapter 3 , 
this volume) and the Pentecostals in Hungary (Povedák,  Chapter 11 , this 
volume). 
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 Therefore, besides the formation of genuine catacomb groups, many of 
those who opted to remain within the offi cially recognized structures of legally 
operating Churches continued to conduct activities that were no longer per-
mitted according to new secular laws. Many forms of pastoral activity such 
as youth and community work, catechism classes, as well as the distribution 
of spiritual literature aimed at transmitting Christian values were now for-
bidden (Fejérdy et al.  2018 , 446) forcing leaders, teachers and youth workers 
into clandestine forms of practice and secret methods of communication (see 
Hesz,  Chapter 10 , this volume). We should add to this summary of groups 
that comprised the religious underground, the small number of alterna-
tive, non- Christian movements that were active during the fi nal decades of 
communism, amongst which were Tibetan Buddhist groups, various Pagan 
movements and Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), all of which were closely 
connected to an existing broader “unoffi cial cultural fi eld” that was recep-
tive to alternative religiosities and spiritualities (see Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson, 
 Chapter 8 , this volume). 
 The Soviet satellite states also later mirrored the policies and actions of the 
Soviet Union with regard to the so- called sects of protestant origin. In the 
Hungarian context, as Köbel notes from an Offi ce of Church Affairs report, 
they were considered “more dangerous than the historical Churches, because 
they don’t have a defi nitive dogma but instead talk about whatever they want 
to” ( Chapter 3 , this volume) whereas in Poland as they were associated with 
the German minority, they were dispossessed and marginalized as “anti- 
Polish” elements (Flemming  2009 , 118– 19). Despite the appearance of a more 
lenient approach to religious minority groups, even after its break with the 
rest of the communist bloc in 1948, Yugoslavia also viewed sectarian groups 
such as the Nazarenes and the Seventh Day Adventists as “anti- communist 
and disloyal.” They were seen as potential supporters of foreign intervention 
due to their international networks in the West and as a danger to the state 
due to their pacifi sm, which directly challenged a central doctrine of Yugoslav 
communism which considered all citizens as defenders of the state (Djuri ć 
Milovanovi ć ,  Chapter 14 , this volume). 
 A further distinct aspect of the religious life of the underground took 
shape amongst believers who found themselves in the labour camps, prisons 
and penal settlements. Periods of time in detention, which could last years 
or even decades, gave birth to creative expressions of spirituality which as 
Petrás ( Chapter 5 , this volume) illustrates with regards to Jehovah’s Witnesses 
in Hungary resulted in a devotional life “enriched and deepened by the per-
secution.” Time spent in labour camps and in exile also presented the pos-
sibility for witnessing and proselytizing amongst fellow prisoners and other 
exile communities, thus facilitating the spread of religious communities to 
far- fl ung places. The religious underground, therefore, was characterized 
by an extremely diverse set of actors, communities and practices, the lived 
experience of which was shaped by state security operations, surveillance and 
imprisonment. In the broadest sense, therefore, authors in this volume use the 
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term religious underground to refer to religious communities, agencies and 
activities that evolved in large part to avoid detection and control. 
 The idea that underground religious activities, diverse as they were, 
constituted genuine resistance to communism has been questioned by some 
as an “idea made up by the regime” (Fejérdy et al.  2018 , 445). Indeed, as 
Vagramenko argues ( Chapter 2 , this volume), the secret police, through their 
practices of documentation, intended to produce an image of clandestine reli-
gious practice as politically dangerous in order to justify the actions taken 
against them. Moreover, communist authorities tended to view any attempt 
to continue to transmit religious faith and belief  as a political act of oppos-
ition (see Pintilescu,  Chapter 4 , this volume) despite the fact that Christians 
themselves may not always have understood their actions in such terms. 
According to this view, Christians who struggled to preserve their way of life 
and faith were not necessarily resisting communism but were rather engaged 
in the positive act of “building Christianity” despite the risks involved (see 
Fejérdy et al.  2018 , 445). This perspective which emphasizes the signifi cance 
of faith as opposed to dissent in discourses of religious agency during the 
communist era can be contrasted, as Wynot highlights, with another ten-
dency amongst historians of the Soviet Union to “underestimate the depth 
of religious feeling amongst the laity” (Wynot  2004 , x) rejecting the idea that 
peasant defi ance of anti- religious campaigns constituted genuine resistance 
instead relegating it to a vague “desire to defend what was simply familiar and 
enjoyable” (Husband cited in Wynot  2004 , x). 
 As chapters in this volume demonstrate, the responses of diverse religious 
groups to repression and control were as radically different as the groups 
themselves. From the outpourings of popular Marian devotion amongst 
Catholics in Poland, discussed by Krzywosz in  Chapter 7 , and the use of 
blessed food as a spiritual weapon against the regime, outlined by Kapaló 
in  Chapter 12 , to clandestine meetings in forests, meadows and baptisms on 
a public beach, described by Petrás in  Chapter 5 , religious agency and cre-
ativity took many forms, some spontaneous, others intricately planned and 
executed. As Pranskevi č i ū t ė ( Chapter 8 , this volume) argues, in the context of 
aggressive anti- religious operations, the activity of groups such as Lithuanian 
Hare Krishnas, despite the fact that it did not “emerge as an open opposition 
to communist ideology” nevertheless constituted a form of resistance against 
the Soviet regime. As she points out, “almost every initiative of the believers 
eventuated in interference by the Soviet apparatus” ( Pranskevi č i ū t ė and Juras 
2014 , 4 cited in Pranskevi č i ū t ė ,  Chapter 8 , this volume). We should consider, 
therefore, these diverse responses as forms of resistance in so much as the 
concrete actions taken undermined or disrupted the state’s ability to pursue 
its social, cultural, and economic policies; the motivation for these actions 
may have been other- worldly but the results were intended also to shape this 
world. Whether viewed as a positive act of building faith, Christian or other-
wise, the realization of a socio- cultural alternative way of living or simply 
as a defence of tradition, the phenomenon of clandestine forms of religion 
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refl ected both conscious and unconscious forms of defi ance, resilience and 
creative agency in differing measures. In this sense, we argue that religious 
resistance as witnessed in the underground activities of these groups should 
not be reduced to a mere construct of the regime nor to a simple unintended 
consequence but rather should be seen as a refl ection of the complexity of life 
under communism (see Blaive  2019 , 7) and of the worldview and agency of 
believers (see Baran  2014 , 49), as well as an important object of research for 
scholars of religion. 
 Particular representations of the religious underground featured in the 
discourse of both sides during the Cold War; these representations were 
produced and projected by the secret police, as described above, whilst also 
being promoted and popularized by Western media and Christian dissidents. 
Through the titles of memoirs such as that of Romanian pastor Richard 
Wurmbrand’s  In God’s Underground and of organizations such as  Underground 
Evangelism , 1 whose mission territory was described as the “unregistered 
underground Church,” the image of heroic priests and pastors defying the 
communist authorities, dodging the secret police, maintaining their faith 
in prison despite mistreatment and torture was powerfully propagated by 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The religious underground, therefore, 
represents a co- construction that – it can be argued – served an important 
function for both sides. This discursive construct, however, also points to a 
complex, multidimensional, material and tangible “reality” that has become 
more visible in its diversity since the opening of the archives of the secret 
police. By approaching the problem of religious repression through the frame 
of the religious underground, rather than seeking to establish a stable con-
cept or fi xed category, we hope to encourage an interrogation of the bound-
aries between the regimes of truth operative during the Cold War and the 
lived realities of religious communities. In doing so, we highlight the “the 
borderline between collaboration and resistance, constructive criticism and 
subversion, culture and politics” (see Blaive  2019 , 7) and encourage refl ection 
on the moral dilemmas, pragmatic choices, emotional impulses and faithful 
actions of religious individuals and groups. There is enormous potential for 
further research on the alternative cultures, material and economic life, ritual 
practices, leadership and social organization in the underground as studies in 
this volume hopefully demonstrate. 
 The secret police 
 We have used the expression “secret police” in the title of this volume as a 
catch- all term. The nomenclature of the Soviet political police, and later that 
of the satellite states, presents a bewildering set of inaccessible names and 
acronyms. As Cristina V ă ț ulescu ( 2010 , 3) has noted, these included organ, 
agency, authority, service, section, commission, and administration. These 
are all terms that shrouded rather than revealed the nature of the activities 
the secret police carried out, which were, in fact, ones we much more readily 
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associate with policing such as “surveillance, investigation, arrest and deten-
tion” (V ă ț ulescu  2010 , 3). In the Hungarian case, although numerous changes 
of name did not indicate a change in the methods of the secret police, nor 
indeed a change in their personnel; more often than not behind them lay a con-
scious political decision which might impact the future operations, power, and 
status of the secret police ( Müller 2012 , 9– 10). Following V ă ț ulescu’s lead, we 
have selected the term secret police as the most appropriate because of the role 
that the “idea” of secrecy played in their activities and operations. The secret 
police were never truly “secret” of course as everyone knew of their existence; 
they presented what V ă ț ulescu has called a “visible spectacle of secrecy” or 
a “histrionic secrecy”  (2010 , 3). Anthropologist Katherine Verdery has also 
challenged the stereotype or assumption of the secret police’s invisibility; she 
characterizes it as a managed performance of secrecy rather than truly secret 
or invisible work. Offi cers could be seen, they were “the guys hanging out 
in places where potential ‘dissidents’ might congregate” (Verdery  2018 , 284), 
they dressed a certain way and had the same haircuts. The very visibility of 
agents, who in some cases were surprisingly obvious and unorthodox in their 
approach (see, for example, Krzywosz,  Chapter 7 , this volume) was designed 
to have a prophylactic effect, acting as a deterrent and constant reminder of 
the watchfulness of the state. 
 In both the early Soviet and satellite contexts, the secret police were the key 
weapon in the pursuit of revolutionary social change with newly established 
secret police forces in Eastern Europe, modelled on and under the close super-
vision of Soviet advisers. Indeed, control of the secret police by local com-
munist parties, with Soviet help, was the critical means by which they could 
eventually take control of government and the state. The degree to which 
these new security organs exercised freedom of action was determined, in 
part, by how secure and trustworthy Moscow perceived the communist lead-
ership to be in each country (Verdery  2014 , 8). Across the occupied states, the 
secret police were directly subordinated to the communist party rather than 
the government, with Soviet advisors and agents determining the structure, 
ideology and practical operational aims and methods of the newly established 
forces. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), as in the Soviet Union, 
the Ministry of State Security and its secret police considered themselves “the 
sword and shield of the party,” not defenders of the people or even of the state 
( Heidemeyer 2015 , 10). 
 The brutal methods of the secret police were fi rst employed in the interest 
of establishing the new ruling order and then in maintaining it. In the satellite 
countries, once the communist regimes had dealt with the immediate threat 
from the enemies of the past, including “fascist elements” and political fi g-
ures from the previous regimes, they turned their attention to dealing with 
the future enemies of the new “democratic order.” A statement in 1947 by 
a captain of the recently renamed and unifi ed Hungarian secret police, the 
Államvédelmi Osztály (ÁVO), captures the signifi cance of this change, “the 
difference lies in the shift in our priorities from the past to the future, that 
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in the fi rst place we no longer have to track down the past political enemies, 
regardless of the seriousness of their crimes, but the prevention of the real-
isation of the aims of those attempting to destroy the democratic state order” 
(cited in  Müller 2012 , 23– 4). 
 Amongst the categories of  new social enemies to be targeted by the secret 
police were the so- called clerical reactionary forces as the manifesto of 
the Hungarian Workers’ Party (MDP) openly declared that “clerical reac-
tion is political reaction painted in the colour of  religion, and thus the fi ght 
against it is political in nature” (Köbel,  Chapter 3 , this volume). Religion 
was regarded by the communists as a façade or mask behind which political 
enemies were cloaked. From the late 1940s on, secret police agencies began 
to establish units dedicated to pursuing, surveilling and countering the activ-
ities of  the clergy and Churches categorized as reactionary forces. In Soviet 
Moldavia, as Ca ș u describes ( Chapter 6 , this volume), in March 1946, when 
the MGB of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was created, 
as in other Soviet Republics, the special department dealing with religion 
was named department “O” and was responsible for operations against the 
clergy of  legally registered religious denominations as well as anti- Soviet 
elements amongst adherents of  sects, Jewish spiritual leaders and Zionists. In 
Hungary, following the creation of  the Államvédelmi Osztály (ÁVO) in 1946, 
the 3rd Sub- department was dedicated to the surveillance of  the Churches 
with its tasks described as “the gathering of  information related to Churches, 
dissemination of  information and prevention of  the spying operations of 
Churches”  (Müller 2012 , 29). Such sub- departments at the central level, as 
was the case in Romania, were often mirrored at the regional level (Pintulescu 
 2018 , 131). 
 Depending on the context, the relative danger projected onto various reli-
gious groups differed but communities that refused to participate in social 
and political life, that rejected civic duties such as the military draft, or whose 
members refused to compromise in terms of their proselytizing activities 
were considered high priority enemies. In rural contexts, the religious enemy 
was often assimilated with the principal class enemies in the countryside, the 
wealthy peasants or kulaks, who were targeted for opposing the collectiviza-
tion of agriculture or for resisting grain requisitioning. In Hungary, especially 
following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 (Kiss et al.  2012 , 38), and in 
Czechoslovakia (see Mat ě jka,  Chapter 9 , this volume), the danger of so- 
called “clerical reaction,” was fi rst and foremost associated with the Catholic 
Church. Nevertheless, the category could be and was expanded to include also 
other Churches. The Protestant Church in Czechoslovakia, considered loyal 
by the regime until the late 1950s (see Mat ě jka,  Chapter 9 , this volume), was 
later targeted as a reactionary force in society, as were the so- called dangerous 
sects across the region (see Petrás,  Chapter 5 , this volume). Indeed, terms such 
as “Clerical reaction” were extremely elastic and could be applied to any reli-
gious group depending on ideological or political need at any given time (see 
Kiss  2012 , 38). 
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 Once the communist regimes had established their hegemonic positions, 
the role and operational priorities of the secret police shifted away from revo-
lutionary change to the maintenance of the new status quo. One aspect of this 
was policing the new legal basis of Church- state relations. Based on principles 
adopted in the Soviet Union, policy towards religion was designed to appear 
to separate religious institutions from the state but in effect also aimed to 
control them from within. This “hostile separation” model, gave legal guar-
antees of freedom of conscience and equal treatment for all recognized reli-
gious institutions whilst placing them under the supervision of state offi ces or 
councils of religious affairs. In tandem with these other government bodies, 
the secret police were tasked with achieving total control in the religious 
sphere (see Köbel,  Chapter 3 , this volume;  Ș incan,  Chapter 15 , this volume, 
and Djuri ć Milovanovi ć ,  Chapter 14 , this volume). 
 The system introduced in the Soviet Union, and later in the communist 
satellite states, carried echoes of the strategies employed earlier in the Russian 
and Habsburg Empires (see Werth  2014 ). In Tsarist Russia, co- opting the 
Orthodox clergy to police itself, as well as wider society, was later employed 
rather effectively in some communist states. In Romania, Orthodox churchmen 
continued to police religious practice in line with the state’s expectations, 
much as they had done in pre- communist times (see Vasile,  Chapter 13 , this 
volume). In order to secure near total reach in terms of information gathering 
and infl uencing the religious portions of the population, the regime recruited 
agents from amongst the clergy and leadership (as illustrated in Chapters 
by Krzywosz, Vasile, Cindrea- Nagy and Ca ș u in this volume); this practice 
was widespread, with collaborative priests’ loyalty to the regime rewarded in 
various ways including lucrative leadership positions, career opportunities for 
family members, and places in university for their children. 
 The avowed desire to eliminate religion from society was balanced by a 
pragmatic realization that in certain contexts religious actors and institutions 
that had the potential to be suitably disciplined or had proven suffi ciently 
tractable could be useful instruments in the pursuit of the regime’s longer- 
term strategic goals, particularly in the post- war arena of Cold War global 
politics. The Romanian Orthodox Church, as Vasile explains ( Chapter 13 , this 
volume), benefi ted from the state’s suppression of the Greek Catholic Church 
in 1948, whereby more than one million believers were coerced into chan-
ging their denominational allegiance. This move “amounted to a successful 
but paradoxical proselytism carried out by a self- avowed atheistic regime” 
(Vasile  Chapter 13 , this volume) to the benefi t of the majority Orthodox 
Church, which the state considered easier to bend to its will. Some majority 
or mainstream Churches in the region enjoyed unrivalled access to the 
higher echelons of the party, whilst dissenters were increasingly marginalized 
and repressed. Indeed, repression by the state might result of from simul-
taneous charges of anti- communist activity and alleged heretical practices 
(see Vasile,  Chapter 13 , this volume). This model of Church- state relations 
adopted across the region, as Köbel ( Chapter 3 , this volume) describes in the 
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Hungarian context, facilitated a “fl exible praxis” allowing the secret police 
to operate against individuals or groups at any given time based on low- level 
orders and instructions, or “backstage legislation,” rather than on the basis of 
comprehensive laws that theoretically would protect freedom of conscience 
and religious practice. 
 In the post- Stalinist era, the secret police transformed from a violent 
repressive force into a highly effective “preventive institution” (Verdery  2018 , 
285) based on fear and intimidation rather than the overt terror of the past. 
But as Blaive ( 2019 , 2) has explained, fear was not only an instrument of “pol-
itical submission” utilized by the regime, but also a dimension of the relation-
ship between those in power and the population, since the authorities “feared 
their people too” and had to take account of the changing external context. 
Pressure generated by the activities of dissidents and international appeals by 
members of the religious underground to international bodies contributed 
signifi cantly to the pressure that the communist leadership experienced to 
relax its anti- religious operations and grant new freedoms. 
 As a result, as Köbel ( Chapter 3 , this volume) demonstrates, the legal status 
of Churches and religious communities could and did change over time. This 
often came about due to “changed external political conditions,” which in 
Hungary coincided with Hungarian membership in the United Nations, the 
signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1975, 
and, in the fi nal years of communism, the state’s desire to curry economic 
or political favour with the West and other important international trading 
partners. On the whole, policies towards religious groups from the late 1950s 
onwards balanced a range of factors, ensuring that the outward appearance 
of religious freedom was maintained whilst multiple forms of pressure were 
applied on institutions, clergy and believers. 
 Secret police operations 
 As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, the numerous shifts in state 
policy towards religious institutions and communities resulted in extremely 
diverse secret police operations. Whilst it would be impossible to capture the 
full scope of secret police operations employed against the religious under-
ground, the chapters in this volume illustrate a range of operational methods 
and goals from their inception in the early Soviet context in 1920s Ukraine 
(Lisnic, Chapter 1), to the Stalinist- era mass repression from the 1930s to the 
early 1950s (Vagramenko and Ca ș u,  Chapters 2 and  6 respectively) through the 
anti- religious campaigns of the Khrushchev- era (see Kapaló,  Chapter 12 and 
Krzywosz,  Chapter 7 ) right up to the closing decades of communism in 1970s 
Hungary (Povedák,  Chapter 11 , this volume) and 1980s Soviet Lithuania 
under the renewed anti- religious policies of Yuri Andropov, a former 
Chairman of the KGB (Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amonson,  Chapter 8 ). The objectives 
of these diverse operations also varied tremendously, from the elimination 
of so- called enemies of the people and the “destruction of the prestige” of 
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religious leaders to the suppression of local religious enthusiasm and the infi l-
tration and manipulation of international networks and Churches. Although 
many studies exist on the organization, recruitment, operational methods and 
changing role of the secret police in various national contexts, the specifi c 
means by which these were applied or mobilized against the religious under-
ground has remained understudied, particularly in a comparative frame. 
 As a number of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, the secret police’s 
operational role combined the generation of information and the produc-
tion of knowledge about the enemy with the implementation of policies 
designed to undermine, eliminate, or control their targets. These two distinct 
dimensions of their work were present from the very beginning of the institu-
tion. As Lisnic outlines ( Chapter 1 , this volume), in the early 1920s before the 
Cheka, the fi rst Soviet secret police force, had built the capacity to generate 
information at the local level, the authorities relied on subordinate networks 
of County Departments of Secret Informers for their intelligence. As the 
secret police evolved, the information gathering and operational roles of the 
secret police were mutually dependent, “gathering information was shaped 
from the very beginning in order to produce evidence to legitimate future 
repressive measures” (Pintilescu,  Chapter 4 , this volume). This involved the 
ascription of political or antisocial, and therefore criminal, meaning to reli-
gious practices and beliefs through a “rhetoric of unmasking” (V ă ț ulescu 
 2010 , 24) that applied to all classes of social enemy, not just religious ones. 
Stalinism, as V ă ț ulescu describes it, propagated a way of looking, a “watch-
fulness,” or an “omnipresent call for vigilance” ( K ř iš ť ál 1985 , 108 cited in 
Mat ě jka,  Chapter 9 , this volume), that required a peeling back of “the surface 
of reality in expectation of the worst” (V ă ț ulescu  2020 ). The secret police were 
the main instrument through which this compulsion to unmask hidden hostile 
elements in society was achieved. 
 Until the late 1920s, signifi cant differences existed between how enemies 
were perceived and constructed depending from where they were being 
viewed. In the fi rst few years after the Bolshevik takeover, as Lisnic 
demonstrates ( Chapter 1 , this volume), conceptions of precisely which reli-
gious groups constituted the enemy could differ signifi cantly between the 
political centre and the various layers of the bureaucracy, with offi cials asso-
ciating “the idea of enmity with a set of obstacles which hindered the imple-
mentation of the policies they were in charge of.” These agencies, Lisnic 
concludes, saw the “formation of different images of the same religious group 
at different levels of administration” (Lisnic, Chapter 1, this volume). This 
situation changed, however, as War Communism gave way to the period of 
the New Economic Policy in 1921. 
 By the 1930s, the means of construction of knowledge about religious 
communities had become much more sophisticated and centralized. Taking 
as her case study the model criminal fi les that were compiled on the True 
Orthodox Church, Vagramenko ( Chapter 2 , this volume), demonstrates how 
internal top- secret publications produced by the GPU, the State Political 
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Directorate as the Soviet secret police were known at the time, were compiled 
and disseminated. The construction of the ecclesiastic- monarchist under-
ground in these model cases, which succeeded in unmasking simple peasants as 
“agitators” or “spies” in a highly organized underground network implicated 
in the machinations of “foreign intelligence agencies,” illustrates the process 
by which “an alternative reality” could be created “where people and social 
relations got new roles and meanings” (Vagramenko citing  Melley 2000 , 42). 
Diverse pieces of information, both visual and textual, were systematically 
“dislodged from their initial context,  estranged, and then re- assembled in a 
new way” in order to produce criminal evidence. 
 As the secret police vision and production of serviceable knowledge about 
religious leaders and groups became more sophisticated, study manuals and 
operational guides were produced that outlined Marxist historical critiques of 
religion and Church history based on the regime’s idea of scientifi c atheism. 
These manuals supplied offi cers with the conceptual tools and vocabulary to 
enable them to “rewrite” religious meaning, actions and lives in their reports. 
These resources, which generally represent a synthesis of empirical experience 
gained in real operations with heavy doses of ideologically inspired fantasy, 
often bore infl ated titles such as the manual authored by two Romanian secret 
police offi cers in 1983 entitled
 Aspects of the hostile activity conducted by autochthonous elements 
incited by emissaries of reactionary religious centres and organisations 
abroad. Measures taken by organs of the state security for the preven-
tion and counteracting of enemy actions conducted under the cover of 
religion. 2 
 In 1960s Poland, as Krzywosz notes ( Chapter 7 , this volume), the 
continued prevalence of  miracles and apparitions, which were said to be 
caused by reactionary elements amongst the Catholic clergy, were deemed 
dangerous enough to warrant the production of  a special manual dedicated 
to combating these forms of  political insurrection allegedly disguised as 
popular devotion. 
 Such manuals supplied offi cers with political interpretations of religious 
history, terminology and expressions. In the example offered by Petrás 
( Chapter 5 , this volume), terms that appeared in Jehovah’s Witness literature 
such as the “realm of the Satan” and “This world is condemned and its days 
are counted!” were given political meaning. Such translations, however, in 
overwriting their original eschatological meaning, had the potential to mis-
lead Hungarian secret police agents and so, despite the production of expert 
specialist materials, a lack of genuine theological and practical knowledge of 
religious practices sometimes directly hindered secret police operations. This 
was the case when Hungarian secret police offi cers failed to recognize the sig-
nifi cance and incriminatory nature of a confi scated photograph of Jehovah’s 
Witness believers seemingly enjoying a bathing holiday at Lake Balaton, 
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which was, in fact, a photograph taken on the occasion of an illegal mass 
baptism (Petrás,  Chapter 5 , this volume). 
 Mistaken interpretations and false constructions composed and 
disseminated by acting secret police offi cers shaped the education of future 
offi cers. The highly fl awed interpretation and characterization by the 
Czechoslovak StB ( Státní bezpe č nost ) of the so- called New Orientation within 
the Czech Protestant Church described by Mat ě jka ( Chapter 9 , this volume), 
which constructed a group of progressive left- leaning pastors and believers 
as “a second power centre” was “so persuasive that it became a pedagogical 
resource for students of the StB faculty of the Police University” and was 
reproduced in a number of master theses at the Police University. The manuals 
and theses composed about clerical reactionary forces, as Mat ě jka points out 
in relation to the Czechoslovak case, may also have served as powerful tools 
of “self- legitimization” offering a platform on which to provide “arguments 
explaining the ongoing importance of the StB” and to justify “its relevance 
and raison- d’être in the context of  perestroika and  glasnost .” 
 The specialist secret police publications discussed in this volume document 
the powerful imperative for all underground religious groups to conform to 
the image of an enemy constructed by the state, whether this refl ected reality 
or not. By the 1930s, as Vagramenko illustrates ( Chapter 2 ), the Soviet secret 
police characterized the religious underground as highly organized, politically 
motivated, and internationally connected and the secret police went to great 
lengths to visualize and materialize the invisible networks that constituted the 
underground according to their understanding and ideological need. In rela-
tion to some groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses (see Baran  2014 , 49), the 
Soviet authorities were dealing with genuine underground networks as com-
plex and organized as the state’s projections but secret police understanding 
of other groups such as the extremely diverse groups of Orthodox dissenters 
(discussed by Vagramenko, Lisnic, and Kapaló in this volume), bore little 
relationship to reality, indeed secret police documents demonstrate how the 
regime got “caught up in its own internal falsifi cations” ( Ș incan this volume 
citing Kotkin,  2002 : 36). This was the case with regard to the operation 
described by Mat ě jka ( Chapter 9 , this volume) in which the Czechoslovak StB 
looked so feverishly for “a unifi ed hostile headquarters” and fi rmly believed in 
the existence of “a second power centre” inside the Czech Protestant Church 
that their actions paradoxically contributed to its very formation. As Mat ě jka 
concludes, the StB constructed the enemy so effectively that it “succeeded (at 
least partly) in creating it.” 
 The repertoire of discursive strategies available to the secret police in 
unmasking religion was diverse but nonetheless highly formulaic. Anti- 
religious rhetoric across all of the communist states was based on the Soviet 
model with propaganda and operational campaigns following the shifts in 
policy in Moscow quite closely. One of the most signifi cant means of pro-
ducing or amplifying political guilt during the Cold War, was to accuse reli-
gious actors of being in league with the external enemies of the communist 
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world, particularly with imperialist Western powers. Jehovah’s Witnesses 
in Romania were charged with being members of a “conspiratorial group 
intent on subverting the regime, that was controlled directly from the United 
States, the centre of the capitalist world” (Pintulescu,  Chapter 4 , this volume), 
while in Yugoslavia, Nazarenes and Adventists were accused of enemy 
activity including “propaganda and espionage for foreign agents” (Djuri ć 
Milovanovi ć ,  Chapter 14 , this volume). As late as the 1980s, during a period 
of renewed concern over ideological decay within the Soviet Union, one leader 
of the Krishna Consciousness movement could be declared an agent of the 
CIA “specializing in ideological diversions, including subversive activities of 
imperialism against the socialist system” that were designed to “destroy the 
country from the inside” (Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amonson,  Chapter 8 , this volume). 
 The Catholic Church was also regarded as one of the main external enemies 
of communist governments. This was based on a number of factors including 
the highly centralized character of the Catholic Church led from the Vatican, 
over which communist regimes had little control, the ideological infl uence 
the Church wielded globally, but not least the Church’s economic and social 
power in some satellite countries such as Poland or Hungary. As Árpád von 
Klimó relates with regard to Hungary, before the establishment of the com-
munist system, the Catholic Church was the country’s largest landowner, 
overseeing thousands of schools and controlling dozens of publishing houses 
and newspapers. It also enjoyed the support of lay organizations and associ-
ations counting hundreds of thousands of members (Klimó  2016 , 51– 2). 
 Central to the construction of knowledge and of political guilt of reli-
gious actors, as both Pintilescu and Vagramenko point out in their studies 
(see  Chapters 4 and  2 respectively), was the wider network or set of social 
relations. People could be understood and incriminated “sometimes by simply 
invoking their membership in a ‘counter- revolutionary organisation’ ” simpli-
fying legal or bureaucratic procedures because, “instead of compiling indi-
vidual criminal investigation fi les, they compiled group fi les” (Pintilescu, 
 Chapter 4 , this volume). The production of knowledge, therefore, in regard 
to the unmasking of the hostile activities of the clerical reaction, served a 
number of functions and produced a range of responses and signifi cantly it 
could serve as a means to justify the perception that the work of the secret 
police continued to be necessary, thus shoring up its preeminent position as 
the defender of the people. 
 Religions and members of religious communities were targeted as part 
of a much wider process of identifying anti- Soviet or counter- revolutionary 
social elements, a process that reached extraordinary proportions in the 
mass repressions of the late 1930s to the early 1950s. In this period, entire 
social categories or portions of the population became targets of the NKVD, 
including former kulaks, “national elements” or untrustworthy ethnic groups, 
and petty criminals, with the aim being the total “excision from the body 
politic” of these population cohorts (Hagenloh  2009 , 8). This approach, as 
Hagenloh concludes, eroded the distinction between civil and political crime 
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and between civil and political policing (Hagenloh  2009 , 10). Religious groups 
could, therefore, be routinely classifi ed both as a political enemy and as a 
social, moral and even medical threat to society. 
 As Lisnic demonstrates in his case study of ethnic- Moldovan Inochentists 
in 1920s western Ukraine ( Chapter 1 , this volume), a “socially dangerous 
element” might combine suspect class identity with political, geographical, 
ethnic, and behavioural layers of guilt. Recidivism, or vagrancy, was one such 
suspect behaviour that was associated primarily with criminal activities (see 
Hegenloh  2009 , 81– 3) but formed also part of the construction of an image 
of certain religious groups as dangerous, such as wandering ex- monastics and 
preachers of various sects. In the case of Inochentism, the mobility of elements 
in the underground led to accusations of kidnapping and the sexual exploit-
ation of young girls who had “disappeared” into the sectarian underground 
(see also Kapaló  2019 , 229– 37). Indeed, the invisible or secretive nature of the 
religious underground, which was in most cases, but not all, a consequence 
of the repressive policies of the state, enabled the shocking accusations 
based on secret police case fi les that appeared in anti- religious propaganda 
to appear plausible to the public, including accusations of child murder 
amongst Jehovah’s Witnesses (see Baran  2014 , 73). The charge of so- called 
“anti- human” and “anti- social” behaviour, and especially the risk this posed 
to young people (see Djuri ć Milovanovi ć ,  Chapter 14 , this volume), remained 
a central element of secret police discourse on the dangers of the religious 
underground. Even in the fi nal years of the Soviet Union, KGB reports and 
the propaganda press represented members of the Krishna Consciousness 
movement as “antisocial people who used various drugs, organized orgies, 
and so on” (Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson,  Chapter 8, this volume). As the chapters 
in this volume demonstrate, a religious identity as defi ned and constructed by 
the secret police had the potential, at various times and in different contexts, 
to weave together layers of political, class, ethnic, geographic, medical, and 
social behavioural guilt in the construction of a total enemy. 
 Knowing and representing the enemy was a necessary and integral part 
of direct repressive operations, which took various forms and could com-
bine a range of measures or methods. Mass arrest and deportation to Siberia 
and other remote and inhospitable regions of the Soviet Union for resettle-
ment and forced labour was one of the earliest instruments of mass terror 
employed by the Soviet state and is associated primarily with the Stalinist- 
era. This approach was applied widely to other cohorts of the population 
such as kulaks and suspect ethnic groups but religious communities also were 
sometimes the explicit target of such mass operations. An early example of 
the deportation of a religious community is discussed by Lisnic ( Chapter 1 , 
this volume) who demonstrates that the operation against Inochentists from 
Odessa Oblast in 1923 required the kind of top- down centralized planning 
that could be achieved only once communications had improved between 
various layers of the administration and the Joint State Political Directorate, 
or OGPU, as the Soviet secret police were called during 1922– 34. 
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 From 1929, the same year that the Law on Religious Associations was 
introduced heralding the mass, systematic closure of Orthodox Churches and 
religious institutions, OGPU was entrusted with running the entire Soviet 
penal system, the so- called Gulag, or Main Camp Administration ( Glavnoe 
upravlenie lagerei ), making such mass operations easier to co- ordinate. At 
the height of the Gulag system, Orthodox clergy, monks and nuns, members 
of the sects and underground religious communities were subject to extra-
judicial arrest, sentencing and deportation usually involving a simple deci-
sion by  troikas , headed by the local NKVD chief (by this point the NKVD 
had taken on the role of the secret police). In 1944, around 1,000 members 
of the underground True Orthodox Church were exiled in a single operation 
(Baran  2014 , 59) but the largest mass deportation of a religious group, and 
also the fi nal one before Stalin’s death, targeted Jehovah’s Witnesses. Labelled 
“Operation North” and planned and executed by the MGB (Ministry of State 
Security) offi cers on April 1, 1951, this operation deported more than 16,000 
Witnesses to Siberia and Central Asia from Western territories of the Soviet 
Union including the Moldavian SSR (today’s Moldova), Northern Bukovina 
in Western Ukraine and the Baltic Republics. Operation North coincided with 
operations against Jehovah’s Witnesses across the communist satellite states 
that took various forms, including house raids and show trials (see Petrás, 
 Chapter 5 , this volume). Decisions by  troikas or, as in the case of Operation 
North, by the Special Board ( Osoboe Soveshchanie ) of the MGB were, as 
Ca ș u points out ( Chapter 6 , this volume), extrajudicial and therefore tech-
nically illegal according to Soviet legislation and exemplify the fl exible praxis 
employed by the communist state. 
 Stalinist- era repression of socially harmful elements also entailed the mass 
surveillance of targeted suspect populations. From the 1930s, following the 
OGPU’s takeover of civil as well as political policing, surveillance, agent infi l-
tration, and the registration of the population and its movements, became part 
of a top- down plan for a preventive system of population control. Although 
early attempts at covert operations and undercover surveillance had limited 
success in some areas (Hegenloh  2009 , 13), the recruiting and implanting 
of undercover agents for surveillance and information gathering became an 
important element in secret police operational work targeted at religious com-
munities. This policy resulted in a majority of leaders of Protestant groups 
in the Soviet Union engaging in some form of collaboration with the KGB 
(Vagramenko  2021 , in production). 
 Immediately after the communist victory in Yugoslavia in 1945, secret 
police operations against religious sects with international ties combined 
surveillance work, or counter- intelligence, with covert infi ltration and intelli-
gence work. As Djuri ć Milovanovi ć recounts ( Chapter 14 , this volume),
 During counterintelligence work, the agent had to be familiar with the 
teachings of the particular “sect,” have detailed information on their 
organisational structures and methods of religious propaganda, follow 
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closely the work and networks of the religious leaders and control reli-
gious activities and rituals that preached activities against the government. 
 In the course of their intelligence work, the agent had to “infl uence the 
sect’s leadership towards working for the benefi t of the country and being a 
model organisation.” In Operation North, the Soviet MGB engaged in exten-
sive agent infi ltration ( Chapter 6, this volume) and at the height of Hungarian 
operations against the Catholic Church following the Hungarian Revolution 
in 1956, 197 Catholic priests had been recruited as undercover agents (Kiss 
et al.  2012 , 35) who succeeded in infi ltrating “themselves into every organiza-
tional and functional aspect of the Church” (see also Köbel,  Chapter 3 , this 
volume). 
 The embedding of agents, as Ca ș u’s case study ( Chapter 6 , this volume) 
illustrates, served a number of purposes. In the case of JWs in Soviet 
Moldavia, they could be used to determine whether targeted communities 
were aware of their impending fate. The use of several agents in a single group 
could also guarantee the accuracy of information gathered as well as assure 
the reliability of individual agents and informers. In the case of Operation 
North, infi ltration of the community was part of a strategy designed both to 
facilitate the smooth realization of the deportation and to shape the behav-
iour of the community going forward. As Ca ș u suggests, the ultimate goal of 
the infi ltration of the community, and the intentional omission of some JWs 
from the deportation, “was not to destroy the whole organization but to bring 
it under the control of the state security organs” and ultimately create the 
possibility to infi ltrate JWs’ international networks, thus extending the reach 
of the secret police beyond Soviet borders ( Chapter 6 , this volume). This case 
demonstrates that a combination of approaches by the secret police could be 
aimed at achieving more complex outcomes, in which control was deemed 
more useful than outright elimination. 
 Reliance on large numbers of informers, some highly trained and dedicated, 
others informal, irregular and unreliable, was characteristic of the post- 
Stalinist era. In Romania, for example, the number of informers rose from 
73,000 in 1968 to 144,289 in 1989 (Stan  2013 , 62). The operation against the 
Inochentist- Stilist community described by Kapaló ( Chapter 13 , this volume) 
demonstrates the contribution that might come from signifi cant numbers 
of religious insider- informers that had intimate knowledge of the commu-
nity and understood very well the beliefs that lay behind their practices. 
As the secret police operation against the pilgrimage to the Marian appar-
ition site at Zabłudów in Poland in 1965 (Krzywosz,  Chapter 7 , this volume) 
shows, informers comprised a vital component of a complex operation that 
lasted over a period of two years. This multifaceted approach was applied 
in a remote rural context and, in contrast to the operation launched against 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moldavia, was reactive rather than proactive. By the 
end of the operation the secret police, in collaboration with the Provincial 
People’s Militia, included the surveillance of pilgrims arriving at the site of 
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the Marian apparition, warning talks (so- called  profi laktika ), surveillance and 
intimidation of the visionary and her family, a propaganda press campaign, 
roadblocks to quarantine the local area, mass perlustration of correspond-
ence, special radio links to headquarters, and direct violent intervention by the 
Citizen’s Militia against those who gathered at the site. Local public sanitation 
authorities were also mobilized by the secret police in order to emphasize the 
personal health risk to pilgrims who were drinking the local spring water. 
The operation described by Krzywosz represents a total mobilization of every 
possible human and technological resource at the disposal of the secret police 
to put a stop to a spontaneous manifestation of religious devotion. 
 The success of the operation, as Krzywosz demonstrates, hinged on the 
ability of the secret police to recruit a wide range of informers from every 
segment of the local population, from amongst the pilgrims, from the local 
town, from amongst the priesthood and even from within the religious 
visionary’s immediate family, thus ensuring that “the secret police had a full 
picture of married life, family and social relations of the Jakubowski family 
at their disposal.” The ability of the secret police to “colonise” all signifi cant 
relationships (see Verdery  2018 , 183) and to intimidate and use to their advan-
tage local relations, rumours and rivalries relied on the invisible work of the 
secret informers. In contrast, the secret police agents in this case were known 
and visible to the residents of Zabłudów. They were conducting, as mentioned 
earlier, a performative operation that was designed to be both threatening and 
preventative (see Va ț ulescu  2010 , 3). 
 The potential and methods used for recruiting informers differed, 
depending on the nature of the targeted Church or community. In Romania, 
as explained by Cindrea- Nagy ( Chapter 16 , this volume), the techniques used 
to recruit Orthodox clergy, who were offered protection or privileges against 
the threat of severe consequences if  they refused to collaborate, differed from 
those employed when seeking to access the so- called neo- Protestant Churches, 
such as Adventists or Pentecostals, which could be infi ltrated more readily 
by planting informers posing as new converts. In all cases, however, com-
promising information, especially relating to moral and sexual conduct was 
commonly used to blackmail and intimidate potential recruits (see  Ș incan, 
 Chapter 15 , this volume). Informers were often used to sow doubt and division 
within communities, especially amongst followers of the smaller Churches or 
sects (see Cindrea- Nagy,  Chapter 16 , this volume), as was the plan of the 
State Offi ce in Hungary described by Petrás ( Chapter 5 , this volume) which 
intended “to split the loyal and reactionary segments within the sect” with the 
aim of offering legal recognition to the loyal wing of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
and make them join the Council of Free Churches. The secret police, however, 
were not always successful in recruiting informers as Mat ě jka ( Chapter 9 , this 
volume) outlines in relation to the Czechoslovak secret police attempts to 
infi ltrate the Czech Protestant Church. As this case demonstrates, attempts 
could backfi re as they did when a group of Czech pastors publicly recounted 
their experience of being blackmailed to inform on colleagues. As a result, 
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this operation failed and had the opposite effect instead encouraging “a new 
sense of loyalty and cohesiveness among Protestant opponents of the regime.” 
 In terms of the chronology of anti- religious campaigns in the Soviet 
Union, the fi nal phase came during General Secretary Yuri Andropov’s term 
as General Secretary. As Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amonson ( Chapter 8 , this volume) 
explains, a range of operational means were employed including under-
cover agents and informers tasked with uncovering and disrupting lines of 
communication amongst ISKCON members within the Soviet Union, the 
application of “administrative legal and preventive warning measures,” or so- 
called  profi laktika , as well as house raids and arrests. Warning conversations 
or interviews were a common method deployed in Soviet Lithuania (see 
Harrison  2010 ), which as Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amonson recounts involved both 
intimidations, such as threats to expel them from an institute or other work-
place, and incentives. As a result of the operations, “almost all original 
devotees had to quit educational institutions, and some of them lost their 
jobs” whilst others were imprisoned or committed to psychiatric hospitals 
where they were forcibly treated with psychotropic drugs. 
 In contrast to the picture created by the high profi le cases discussed thus 
far, it is important to note that a large proportion of evidence from secret 
police archival sources, as Hesz ( Chapter 10 , this volume) illustrates, show us 
that a great deal of offi cers’ time and attention was dedicated to documenting 
and prosecuting far less dramatic cases. Rather than uncovering complex 
organizations with ties to international centres, low- level economic activity by 
clergy or the recording of simple religious rituals such as marriages or baptisms 
that in most states, at most times, was frowned upon but not illegal, was the 
day- to- day work of many offi cers engaged with the clerical reaction. Secret 
police operations, which were oftentimes violent, callous and brutal, like the 
operations that targeted other segments of the population, were intended not 
simply to dominate but also to shape the population (see Hegenloh  2009 , 11). 
Critical to our understanding of the aims and implications of these extreme 
attempts at social engineering are the archival records compiled by the secret 
police themselves. 
 Secret police archives and the politics of the religious fi eld in 
post- communism 
 At the height of the demonstrations that swept East Germany in the autumn 
of 1989, attention was already turning to the secret police and their archives. 
Erich Mielke, the Head of the Stasi, began ordering the destruction of 
state security fi les beginning with evidence of illegal phone tapping and 
postal interceptions as well as the lists of names of unoffi cial informers and 
collaborators (Engelmann  2015 , 176). In Hungary, in the months following the 
change of political system in October 1989, fi lm footage emerged of the sur-
reptitious destruction of secret police fi les precipitating the so- called Dunagate 
scandal (Uitz  2008 , 58), whilst, in Romania, in the chaos of the days that 
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followed the revolution in December of that year, there were several reports 
from various corners of the country of secret police documents being system-
atically destroyed or stolen (Stan  2005 ). Mielke soon followed up his initial 
order with instructions to destroy a much wider range of Stasi fi les including 
the shredding of sensitive Church Department documents (Engelmann  2015 , 
176). Protesters responded by storming the Stasi Headquarters to prevent 
their destruction. 
 In the years and decades that have followed, the fate of, access to, uses 
and methods of interpretation of secret police fi les have been at the heart 
of a range of historical questions, political debates, and public controversies. 
The opening of secret police archives constituted one of the most important 
aspects in the broad movement for transitional justice and remains the most 
contentious element in a “symbolic battle for the possession of the past” in 
post- communist Eastern Europe (Horváth  2008 , 247). All the studies in this 
volume draw directly on secret police archives or engage with the critical 
questions that they provoke for researchers of the past and for religious actors 
in the present. As several chapters in this volume demonstrate, Churches, reli-
gious leaders and believers have become embroiled in the numerous contro-
versies that surround the secret police archives in post- communist societies. 
 Access to communist- era secret police fi les coincided with the transform-
ational infl uence of the “archival turn” in the humanities and social sciences. 
The archive, under the infl uence of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, 
has come to be viewed as a critical mechanism of societal control exercised 
through the production and legitimation of historical memory. Viewed 
through these optics, aspects of human cultures are transformed, alienated, 
hidden and subverted through the mechanisms of the archive which in the 
process empowers some whilst divesting others of vital political, cultural and 
spiritual capital. In the context of post- communist Eastern Europe, histor-
ical memory, justice and truth- seeking have become shackled to the fate of 
and uses of the secret police archives. The peculiar and paradoxical hold that 
the archives have results from an “enduring belief  in the authority of their 
holdings” ( V ă ț ulescu 2010 , 13) in post- communism which comes despite the 
recognition that the materials they contain are the product of the ideological 
and social engineering projects of regimes whose methods were often illegal 
and immoral. Similar to the colonial archive, the communist- era archive, as 
Luehrmann alerts us, “never intended to be neutral or objective but to partici-
pate in transforming the reality it described” ( 2015 , 32 cited in Vagramenko, 
 Chapter 2 , this volume). 
 Despite the vastness and incontestable richness of the secret police archives, 
access to previously classifi ed archives does not necessarily bring with it deeper 
understanding or conceptual advances (Kotkin  2002 ). In Kotkin’s words, 
these emerge rather from our relationship to the archives and the “worldviews 
and agendas” we bring to them. In this sense, the architecture and ideological 
furniture of the institutions set up to govern the archives in post- communism, 
as well as the ongoing societal perception and uses of the archives that these 
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institutions have wittingly or unwittingly facilitated, shape how historians, 
anthropologists and sociologists conceive them and work with and through 
them. Studies of religion during communism and post- communism, whether 
historical, ethnological, anthropological, or sociological in nature, have only 
recently begun to refl ect on the complex relationship between the archive, the 
subjectivity of the scholar, the politics of memory, and the contemporary 
struggle for political (and religious) capital in the post- communist world. 
 The uses of and levels of access to secret police archival documents differ 
vastly from one national context to another. The process began in the early 
1990s in Czechoslovakia and Germany with the introduction of so- called 
“lustration” measures designed to vet those seeking political offi ce or key 
administrative jobs through an examination of their past using the archives. 
Later, a number of post- communist states passed legislation on access to secret 
fi les and opened specialist secret police archival institutions, as in Lithuania 
(see Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson,  Chapter 8 , this volume) or institutes of memory, 
as in the case of Poland, that are dedicated to uncovering the legacy and 
activities of the secret police in the search for an “authentic” version of the 
past. Some countries in the region, such as Romania and Hungary, have well- 
established public institutions with almost two decades of experience of man-
aging access to their holdings both by those who were targeted by the state 
and by researchers. Others, such as Ukraine and Albania, have only recently 
embarked on this process passing “de- communisation” laws, which have 
granted researchers access for the fi rst time to secret police fi les. In Serbia on 
the other hand, as Djuri ć Milovanovi ć recounts (see  Chapter 14 , this volume), 
despite a request from the European Parliament for the Republic of Serbia to 
fully open its secret police archives as part of the EU accession process, a lack 
of political will and the failure to pass the necessary legislation means that 
access is extremely limited. 
 The various institutions that have been established as custodians of secret 
police archives have taken on a range of distinct roles. Although the mandates 
differ from country to country, alongside the preservation and safeguarding 
of documents, they include the pursuit of processes of lustration or vetting for 
public offi ce, the investigation and exposure of communist crimes including 
the exposure of former agents and informers, managing access of targeted 
individuals to their personal fi les as well as facilitating and developing research 
and education. The remit of these institutions, therefore, is oriented towards 
the future as well as towards the past (see Verdery  2014 ) as they form a central 
platform of projects designed to overcome the legacy of repressive regimes 
and to work towards justice and reconciliation in society. Signifi cantly, as 
Vasile ( Chapter 13 , this volume) notes with regards to the Romanian case, 
such institutions were designed and intended to break the monopoly held 
by ruling elites “on the potentially toxic information found within political 
police archives” and to prevent, or at least reduce, the potential for blackmail 
and manipulation. Facilitating and producing research whilst also engaging in 
public education were also seen as important means of conveying “the moral 
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complexities” of the holdings of the secret police archives which would in 
turn help “counter attempts at slander and vicious labeling of those who had, 
in fact, been victims of the Securitate” (Vasile,  Chapter 13 , this volume). 
 The implications of access, or indeed the lack of access, to secret police 
materials for Churches and religious communities have in some cases been 
profound. As Vasile ( Chapter 13 , this volume) and Cindrea- Nagy ( Chapter 16 , 
this volume) highlight in the case of Romania, responses to the challenges 
posed by the archives have varied greatly, often determined by the relative 
access of Church leaders to the corridors of power in post- communist pol-
itics and their ability to infl uence and shape public perceptions. Members 
of some smaller Churches in Romania, once the opportunity arose, sought 
actively to uncover the uncomfortable past relationship to the secret police 
and the communist regime in what Cindrea- Nagy ( Chapter 16 , this volume) 
describes as an act of “purifi cation” or of “healing the sins of the past.” This 
process offered the opportunity for former collaborators to seek redemption 
through confession of their sins – an opportunity that some but not all took 
up. This was made possible due to the approach unique to Eastern Europe of 
granting access to ordinary citizens, effectively democratizing truth- seeking 
(Stan  2013 , 60) and allowing individuals and communities to determine for 
themselves how secret police reports were used and interpreted. 
 By contrast, the hierarchies of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches 
in Romania, have pursued a very different policy of attempting to prevent evi-
dence of collaboration or collusion in communist crimes from coming to light 
by using their political leverage to hinder the work of archival institutions and 
researchers (Vasile,  Chapter 13 , this volume). At the same time, the Roman 
Catholic, Greek Catholic, and especially the Orthodox Church hierarchies in 
Romania have engaged in the promotion of martyrs of the communist repres-
sion, mainly victims of the regime who suffered and died in prison (Cindrea- 
Nagy,  Chapter 16 , this volume), creating a “sacred narrative” of suffering in 
order to dominate public discussion and defl ect attention away from revelations 
about Church leaders who had been secret police agents or informers. 
 In the case of the Czech Protestant Church, access to secret police arch-
ival documents has been equally divisive. As Mat ě jka outlines ( Chapter 9 , 
this volume), a 2004 publication of StB documents that was distributed to 
every parish in the Church with the aim of helping Czech Protestants “come 
to terms with their past” became the cause of division within the Church 
over competing understandings of the “epic struggle with the StB” that older 
generations like to portray in contrast to the much more complex picture 
of cooperation and accommodation with the communist authorities that 
researchers have uncovered. As Mat ě jka concludes, the interpretation offered 
by a group of secret police offi cers of the “trajectory of Czech Protestants 
between 1948 and 1989 has not stopped producing painful confl icts inside 
the Church milieu to this very day” resulting in a generational fault line 
between older members of the community who accept at face value the StB 
narrative and younger colleagues who have “tried to offer more differentiated 
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interpretations of Czech Protestant history during the communist dictator-
ship based on critical work and utilising a vast array of sources (without 
exclusive preference for StB fi les).” 
 The activities outlined above carried out by or through the institutions in 
charge of secret police documents, rely on a “presumed credibility,” on the 
part of researchers as well as the public at large, and of the archival documents 
compiled by the secret police ( Pehe 2019 , 208), which, as Apor et al. ( 2017 , 
4) point out, was reinforced by these institutions’ claims “about their capacity 
to reveal the truth about the past based on their custody of huge amounts 
of material.” The peculiar and paradoxical power of secret police archival 
documents, which continue to be viewed as sites of authenticity and cred-
ibility due in part to their once hidden and secret nature, makes them the 
quintessential means for legitimizing historical narratives and making claims 
about justice (see Apor et al.  2017 , 4; Blaive  2019 ;  Pehe 2019 , 207) as well as 
making them extraordinarily powerful instruments of political control (see 
Vasile,  Chapter 13 , this volume). As the chapters in this volume by Vasile 
( Chapter 13 ), Cindrea- Nagy ( Chapter 16 ), and Mat ě jka ( Chapter 9 ) demon-
strate, the policies and agendas of the institutions that manage secret police 
archives have profoundly infl uenced how religious communities themselves 
have engaged with and conceive their past. 
 The dynamic that has emerged in the religious fi eld in Romania, the Czech 
Republic, and elsewhere, as mentioned above, is the result of the broader phe-
nomenon in post- communist societies that is linked to the de- communisation 
process as a whole, which has promoted secret police fi les as the vehicle 
through which to apportion blame to perpetrators and establish the inno-
cence of victims. This highly polarized process, as Apor et al. ( 2017 ) argue, has 
produced a simplistic understanding of the moral complexity of the relation-
ship between the secret police and those labelled as collaborators, and the eth-
ical dilemmas faced by ordinary citizens who were threatened, blackmailed, 
or otherwise coerced into collaboration. Whether through attempts to pre-
vent, delay, or restrict access to secret police archival documents or by embra-
cing them as a potential source of closure and redemption, Churches, other 
religious communities, and individual believers have been forced to position 
themselves in relation to the archives. The various strategies pursued by reli-
gious actors have resulted, in some cases, in further internal strife whilst in 
others they have initiated a healing process. The absence of a clear “defi nition 
and epistemology of what constitutes both a victim and a perpetrator” has, as 
Blaive shows ( 2019 , 3), perpetuated a culture of systemic blame of everything 
associated with the communist past and has obstructed more nuanced ana-
lysis of the moral complexities of individual cases. 
 Studying religions through the secret police archives 
 The peculiar signifi cance and power of the secret police archives is in some 
senses amplifi ed in the case of the documents relating to religious groups, 
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which means that studying religions through them presents a number of dis-
tinct challenges as well as opportunities. Generally speaking, state and other 
archives, through their practices, establish their own authority by archiving 
that which is deemed worthy of preserving with the aim of determining how 
future generations should understand their past. Secret police archives, on the 
other hand, have systematically preserved a record of those whom the com-
munist regimes judged as “unworthy,” categorizing and producing knowledge 
about them to suit their ideological purposes. Due to the nature of the way the 
state, through its model of hostile separation, sought to expel religion from 
public life whilst also controlling (and defi ning) religious institutions from 
within, secret police documents disproportionately preserve records of the 
uncomfortable margins of mainstream religions, religious dissenters, trouble-
some rebels, and the religious competitors of the more compliant religious 
hierarchies, that also judged them as “unworthy.” Groups that most offi cial 
state archives systematically excluded and which the state most wanted to 
marginalize through its “knowledge” production and propaganda campaigns 
have been systematically and labouriously documented by the secret police. 
 The mass of documentation that exists is generally considered by historians 
to be more useful for understanding how the secret police “perceived individ-
uals and groups and how the institution worked than for what historians usu-
ally consider to be their main task: reconstructing events” (Pintilescu  2018 , 
148). As Lisnic ( Chapter 1 ), Vagramenko ( Chapter 2 ), Mat ě jka ( Chapter 9 ), 
and others in this volume demonstrate, coming to grips with the discursive 
practices of the secret police is critical for understanding how enemies were 
perceived by the state and how the knowledge that was produced helped defi ne 
operations and actions against these groups, thus shaping the daily activities 
of the secret police (see Pintilescu  2018 , 126– 7). The different categories of 
documentation produced by the bureaucratic processes of the secret police, 
however, offer opportunities for scholars of religions, and for members of 
surviving or descendent communities, to approach other questions that are 
specifi c to religious life. 
 In the absence of ethnographic data from the period, Hesz ( Chapter 10 , 
this volume) and Kapaló ( Chapter 12 , this volume) argue that secret police 
informer fi les have a particular value for research on everyday aspects of lived 
and material religion during communism. Despite the multiple voices, of the 
informer, the offi cer, the target, and the compiler, being layered together in 
reports, hints and fl eeting glimpses of revealing everyday encounters and 
exchanges nevertheless offer insights into aspects of religious life as lived in 
the period. Examples cited by Hesz demonstrate how, despite inconsistent 
and contradictory information being very common, the vividness of some 
reports helps us grasp the agency of individuals and groups in their strategies 
of avoiding attention from the authorities or organizing their ritual life under 
the pressure of surveillance. In many cases, informers were themselves reli-
gious specialists who offered detailed and vivid accounts of religious ritual 
and belief  in order to protect their targets whilst quietly fulfi lling their duty 
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to report. As Hesz outlines, approaching religion as a lived phenomenon and 
employing a vernacular religious lens to these bureaucratic documents, offer 
insights into how individuals navigated the strictures of the regime in the 
expression of their faith. 
 The vividness of  informers’ reports is sometimes matched by the visual 
materials that can be found in secret police fi les. As the chapters by Povedák 
( Chapter 11 ), Vagramenko ( Chapter 2 ), and Krzywosz ( Chapter 7 ) in this 
volume illustrate, in their attempts to incriminate and eliminate certain 
religious groups, the secret police preserved or created valuable visual and 
material traces of  otherwise invisible clandestine communities. Inserted 
into the kilometres of  shelves stacked with case fi les, the archives con-
tain a hidden repository of  confi scated religious materials such as leafl ets, 
brochures, hymn sheets, diaries and community photographs – the ephemera 
of  religious life. These sit alongside photographic images, graphs, maps and 
tables created by the secret police in the course of  their investigations (see 
Kapaló and Vagramenko 2020). Oftentimes, groups such as the Nazarenes, 
discussed by Djuri ć Milovanovi ć ( Chapter 14 ) or the Inochentists discussed 
by Kapaló ( Chapter 12 ), that due to their marginalized status, under-
ground existence, or ambivalence towards the act of  historical documen-
tation, preserved few records themselves, can be found represented in great 
detail in the secret police fi les. Secret police archives, therefore, represent 
an important resource for understanding both how the totalitarian state 
constructed religious “others” in order to incriminate and control them and 
how certain religious communities chose to represent themselves in times of 
extreme repression. 
 As the studies by Vagramenko ( Chapter 2 ), Povedák ( Chapter 11 ), and 
Krzywosz ( Chapter 7 ) show, as well as gathering confi scated materials, the 
secret police employed various photographic and graphic techniques as part 
of their construction of knowledge about and incrimination of religious 
groups. Vagramenko ( Chapter 2 ) illustrates in her study of Soviet model 
criminal fi les, how specifi c visual forms of documentation and representation 
helped establish truths about the religious underground. Photography, in par-
ticular, played an important role in reinforcing the textual message of the fi le. 
Crime- scene photographs, discussed by Povedák ( Chapter 11 , this volume), 
were produced according to highly formulaic specifi cations that were often 
intended to capture the illegal economic activities of targeted groups (see 
also Kapaló  2019 ; Kapaló and Vagramenko 2020). The corpus of images 
in the archives, however, also includes a signifi cant number of confi scated 
photographs that offer the researcher unique access to the self- representational 
practices of groups during communism. As with all other materials found in 
the archives, the photos we fi nd there present both interpretational and ethical 
challenges. Employing the method of photo- elicitation, Povedák ( Chapter 11 , 
this volume) explores the advantages and pitfalls of working with descendent 
communities to redefi ne and recontextualize the photographic holdings of 
the archives. 
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 Drawing on informer reports from an operation targeting Inochentist- 
Stilists in Romania in which the foodways of the community featured heavily, 
Kapaló ( Chapter 12 ) explores the methodological potential of approaching 
the archives from a material religion perspective. Kapaló argues that cer-
tain secret police sources, especially those generated by insiders who acted 
as participants in the social and ritual life of communities, offer us an access 
point to the performative, material and somatic aspects of religious life. In 
response to the overwhelming tendency amongst scholars of communism to 
approach secret police materials from a solely discursive or constructionist 
approach, Kapaló suggests that when viewed through a material lens and 
situated within the broader religious context and lifeworld, the texts and 
images in the archives can reveal important, heretofore overlooked aspects of 
the transmission of religion in the underground. 
 Questions of morality, and especially sexuality, are also ubiquitous in 
secret police documents on religious life, as  Ș incan ( Chapter 15 , this volume) 
demonstrates in relation to Romania. Despite the communist regime’s import-
ation of a code of moral conduct from the Soviet Union, the moral standards 
that secret police offi cers used in policing religious groups betrayed a “hybrid-
ization” that drew on religious aspects and terms. The secret police, as 
 Ș incan’s case studies demonstrate, were able to use information relating to an 
individual’s moral conduct, whether genuine or fabricated, as a means of con-
trol with the Securitate offi cer acting “as moral censor and judge.” The privacy 
of individuals targeted by the state was of course not respected by the secret 
police but today, for the researcher of religion under communism, the protec-
tion of the privacy of victims, especially with regard to issues of health and 
sexuality, is enshrined in law and shapes the practices of archival institutions. 
As  Ș incan’s study demonstrates, this situation presents the researcher with a 
dilemma, as something that was so central to the way the secret police operated 
against religious actors, namely the use of coercion and blackmail based on 
questions of morality and sexuality, is extremely diffi cult legally and ethic-
ally to discuss in academic publications. In the post- communist context, the 
“breaking of the secrecy” that surrounded the archives (Stan  2013 , 75), whilst 
serving to guarantee the break with the past and reassure citizens that surveil-
lance had stopped, also granted the contemporary reader of a secret police 
fi le a “power over the individual” ( Ș incan,  Chapter 15 , this volume) that in 
its ability to shame, blackmail, and destroy reputations was cruelly similar to 
the power exercised by secret police offi cers. Those of us who study religions 
that were under the prying gaze of the secret police are increasingly called to 
refl ect on our positionality. Thus,  Ș incan asks, “as the current readers of these 
fi les, are we imposing similar personal defi nitions of good and bad, moral and 
immoral onto behaviours and narratives in the archival documents?” 
 The archives of the secret police, despite their enormous signifi cance for 
researchers and religious communities alike, have their limits. The problem-
atic epistemological and ethical nature of secret police archival documents 
(and in some cases the lack of access to them), encourages or demands the 
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use of alternative sources. Several of the chapters in this volume engage the 
archival data in dialogue with the archives of religious communities (see 
Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson,  Chapter 8 ; Petrás,  Chapter 5 ; Mat ě jka,  Chapter 9 ) 
and oral historical research (see Petrás,  Chapter 5 ; Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson, 
 Chapter 8 ; Mat ě jka,  Chapter 9 and Povedák,  Chapter 11 , this volume). The 
lack of access to secret police materials, as Djuri ć Milovanovi ć (this volume, 
 Chapter 14 ) outlines in her research on religious minorities in communist 
Yugoslavia, means that historians of religions have to glean as much infor-
mation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and other public administration archives 
and triangulate this with ethnographic research with individuals and com-
munities. Djuri ć Milovanovi ć shows that such research “reveals not only the 
richness of preserved memory but also their personal archival material …” 
including documents related to imprisonment or verdicts from the military 
courts, photographs, letters and books. In her case study of the KGB oper-
ation against ISKCON in Lithuania ( Chapter 8 ), Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson 
also identifi es the inherent problems associated with KGB documents which 
render them insuffi cient as sources when seeking to understand complex 
sociocultural processes such as the success of ISKCON in Soviet Lithuania. 
As Pranskevi č i ū t ė - Amoson asserts, only through the utilization of interviews 
with individuals who were members of ISKCON and were targeted by the 
secret police can we gain insights into the real motivations of members of the 
movement and the actual activities of the KGB, which are often masked in 
the offi cial reports and accounts. 
 Conclusion 
 In this introductory chapter, we have only been able to address some of 
the important historical points, theoretical questions and methodological 
insights that appear in the chapters of this volume. The challenges of working 
with the multidimensional and politically charged secret police archives, as 
this volume seeks to illustrate, are both epistemological and deeply ethical in 
character. Interpreting fi les, reports and images that are antagonistic towards 
their subject, couched in ideological language, formulaic, and misinformed or 
intentionally misleading, incomplete (or selectively withheld) has become the 
business not only of trained historians and lawyers, but also of journalists, 
politicians, and the general public who have pursued vigilante actions (Stan 
 2011 ) in the search for justice, truth or redemption. As such, overreliance on 
secret police materials can, and has, produced extremely distorted views of 
the past that have in turn shaped historical memory, political discourse and 
conceptions of justice and truth in post- communist society. The religious 
underground, which constituted the object of secret police operations being 
both produced and defi ned by them, however, was no mere mirage, meta-
phor or discourse but a lived experience bound by a material existence, social 
bonds and individual agency. It is the aim of this volume to encourage further 
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scholarly refl ection on the complex intersection of the secret police, and their 
archives, and the meaning and lived reality of the religious underground.
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 Notes 
 1  Founded in 1960, Underground Evangelism began by smuggling bibles into the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The organization still operates today under the 
name Mission Without Borders  www.mwbi.org/ about- us . 
 2  Aurel Zapodean and Nicolae Bordeianu (1983),  Aspecte din activitatea ostil ă 
desf ă ș urat ă de elemente autohtone incitate de emisari ai unor centri  ș i organiza ț ii 
religioase reac ț ionare din str ă in ă tate. M ă suri întreprinse de organele de securitate 
pentru prevenirea  ș i contracararea ac ș tiunilor du ș m ă noase desf ă ș urat ă sub acoperirea 
religiei (ACNSAS D008712 vol. 1, 12). 
 Archival sources 
 Consiliul Na ţ ional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securit ă ţ ii [National Council for the 
Study of the Securitate Archives] (ACNSAS), D008712, vol. 1. 
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